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1. Introduction 
 
Industrialization, and the association between technological advance and economic growth, 
brought Europe world economic leadership in the 19th century. However, in the course of the 
20th century, European leadership was lost to the United States, as well as a number of 
dynamic Asian economies, of which Japan was the first to emerge in the process of modern 
economic growth. This loss of European leadership is commonly associated with another 
major technological change: the rise of the mass production system in the United States (e.g., 
David, 1975).  
 
The process of European integration, started after the Second World War primarily as a way 
of achieving political stability and peace, became a major force towards the realization of 
economies of scale in the European economies, and hence as a way for Europe to benefit 
more than it had done before from the mass production system. This had its highpoint in the 
realization of the ‘Europe 1992’ programme, which created a single European market, 
without limitations or the free trade of goods and services or the free mobility of people 
(Tsoukalis, 1997).  
 
As a result of this and other factors related to the diffusion of technology, Europe was able to 
catch-up to the United States over the long postwar period (e.g., Abramovitz, 1979, Nelson & 
Wright, 1992, Pavitt and Soete, 1982), and close some of the productivity gap that had 
emerged in the first half of the 20th century (especially during the 1930s and 1940s). 
However, as we will document below, at the dawn of the 21st century Europe still faces a 
major productivity gap relative to the USA and other world economic leaders, such as Japan. 
This fact of a European backlog relative to especially the USA and the dynamic Asian 
economies, led European political leaders to formulate an ambitious goal for the first ten 
years of the new millennium. At the Lisbon Summit in 2000 the governments of the 
European Union (EU) agreed on the goal of the EU to become by 2010 “the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”.1 This overall goal of the 
‘Lisbon process’ has been embedded in a set of policy guidelines that include the following 
elements: 
• Preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy through better polices for the 
information society and R&D;  
• Stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and 
completion of the single market;  
• Combating social exclusion and modernizing the European social model by investing 
in people;  
                                                 
1 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2002, para. 5. 
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• Sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favourable growth prospects by 
continuing with an appropriate macroeconomic policy mix and improving the quality 
of public finance. 
 
To realize these goals, the review of the Lisbon process at the Barcelona Summit in 2002 has 
explicitly emphasized the importance of Research and Development (R&D). One of its main 
recommendations calls for an increase in European R&D expenditure with the target to reach 
3% of European GDP by 2010, two thirds of this to take the form of business R&D.2 The 
main argument behind this target appears to be the concern that even if in the EU knowledge-
intensive industries have been partially successful in creating employment over the last 
decade, productivity developments have been far less favourable (especially if measured 
against the US). This underperformance is seen as a threat for European competitiveness and 
economic growth in general and, more specifically, for the achievement of the Lisbon goals 
and for the growth of national incomes and living standards. A related concern is the fact that 
the EU performs relatively low in input (business R&D) and output indicators (such as 
patents) of innovative activity. Public policy, with the aim to promote investment in business 
R&D, is therefore seen as a key measure to prevent long-term economic decline (European 
Commission, 2002, Economic Policy Committee, 2002).3 
 
As we argue below there is indeed major evidence that links R&D to productivity 
performance. Also, the adoption of the Barcelona target should contribute to close the gap in 
R&D intensities between the EU and the US economies. However, the extent to which it can 
contribute to offset the productivity gap between the EU and the US remains to be seen. On 
the one hand, as pointed out in the official documents as well, regulatory and other 
institutional differences might play important roles. On the other hand, the EU’s trading 
partners will also benefit from increased European R&D by a higher R&D content of exports. 
Thus, for relative productivity, achieving the Barcelona target is not a zero-sum game.  
 
Based on a simulation exercise, which uses results from the literature and from a longitudinal 
dataset, the paper tries to assess this issue. It starts with a short discussion on the link between 
R&D and productivity growth. Section 3 presents an overview of the existing productivity 
gap between the EU and the US and its development over time and sectors. Section 4 
provides and discusses the simulation results. A conclusion sums up the main findings and 
puts them into the perspective of the debate. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Cf. Presidency Conclusions, Barcelona European Council, 15 and 16 March 2002 para. 47. For a review of the 
progress of the Lisbon process up to then see The Lisbon Strategy. Making Change Happen, Communication 
from the Commission to the Spring European Council in Barcelona, COM(2002) 14 final, 15.1.2002. 
3 See also Productivity. The Key to Competitiveness of European Economies and Enterprises, Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM(2002) 262 final, 21.05.2002. 
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2. The link between R&D and productivity 
 
Economic theorists have accepted the positive link between technological change, 
productivity and economic growth for a long time. Process innovation provides opportunities 
for cost reduction. Product innovation enhances either the range of available intermediate 
inputs for the production process, increasing real output, or increases the availability of 
consumer products with corresponding welfare gains. Indeed, in modern economies, the 
inputs of capital and labour alone cannot account for a large part of output growth in modern 
economies (Solow, 1957). The concept of ‘total factor productivity’ (TFP) has been widely 
used as a measure to explain this residual (see Nadiri, 1970).  
 
In a rich empirical tradition of work on productivity growth (e.g., Griliches, 1979), the total 
factor productivity residual has been related to the accumulation of a ‘knowledge stock’, 
which is not accounted for in the measurement of the conventional capital stock but increases 
output via innovation and technological change. R&D expenditures have been suggested as a 
way of measuring this knowledge stock, and this has led to a range of works relating R&D 
expenditures to total factor productivity growth. This is consistent with the notion in ‘new 
growth theory’ of non-convexities of R&D and knowledge in output, which results in self-
sustaining growth (as in Romer, 1986, 1990).  
 
An important issue in this literature is the idea that R&D not only provides productivity 
benefits for the firms that undertake it, but also for other firms in similar or somehow related 
lines of business. This is the notion of R&D spillovers, indicating that the impact of 
innovation and technology is felt widely rather than being a private pay-off. In this context, 
Griliches (1979, 1993) pointed to the distinction between knowledge and rent spillovers. Pure 
‘knowledge spillovers’ are externalities arising from the public goods characteristics of 
technology and research without the need to engage in economic transactions. These 
externalities can arise from learning, observation and copying such as ‘reverse engineering’ 
and ‘patenting around’. Other transmission channels result from formal and informal contacts 
and networks of scientists, professionals, clients and customers, which go beyond market 
transactions (Mansfield, 1985). Rent spillovers, on the other hand, are defined by a shift of 
innovation rents from the producer to the user of a certain technology due to competitive 
market pressures. From the perspective of the whole economy, this constitutes an unwanted 
measurement error in attributing productivity increases to the wrong entity and can in 
principle corrected by using adjusted output deflators (Triplett, 1996). Yet for an individual 
firm, industry or country, such effects result in real benefits with corresponding productivity 
increases. 
 
Empirically, however, both notions are somewhat difficult to separate, as market interaction 
can facilitate the exchange of technological knowledge. To reflect the different mechanisms 
of spillover transmission and absorption the empirical literature uses basically three different 
weighting schemes to aggregate a stock of indirect, spillover-related R&D. Tansaction-based 
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weights emphasise to some extent the rent spillover component. Usually these are derived 
from interindustry sales (e.g. van Meijl, 1995), investment flows (e.g. Sveikauskas, 1981) or 
from a full input-output framework (e.g. Terleckyj, 1974, 1982, Wolf and Nadiri, 1993 or 
Sakurai et al., 1996). In contrast, weighting by technological distance measures accounts for 
the fact that the absorption of knowledge spillovers is mediated by the technological 
proximity between receiver and transmitter. Such distance may be measured by the type of 
performed R&D (Goto and Suzuki, 1989), the qualifications of researchers (Adams, 1990), 
the distribution of patents between patent classes (Jaffe, 1986) or patent classifications and 
citations (Verspagen, 1997a,b). Technology flow matrices in a sense combine the two 
concepts of technological and ‘market’ proximity by identifying originators and (potential) 
users of a technology or an innovation. Scherer’s user-producer matrix as well as the Yale 
matrix have been derived from patent statistics (Scherer, 1982, Putnam and Evenson, 1994).4 
Many empirical studies have found indeed a relatively high influence of R&D and related 
spillovers to productivity growth but the results depend in some measure on the construction 
of the spillover variable.5  
 
The findings that market transactions and technological closeness matter for productivity 
imply an extension of any meaningful empirical analysis to the global level, at least to the 
major trading partners. There is no a priori reason why international spillovers should be 
modelled differently than domestic spillovers. The total technology content of a product or a 
sector that matters for productivity contains the R&D performed by itself as well as the 
technology acquired by inputs from both domestic and foreign sources. For that reason, 
besides the more static advantages of getting an expanded set of inputs at lower cost 
(including frontier-technology), international trade is an important source for long-term 
development and catching-up (Fagerberg, 1987, Abramovitz, 1986). Especially small open 
economies can benefit disproportionately from international spillovers, not only in a 
development context (Coe et al., 2002) but also amongst developed countries as shown by 
Coe and Helpman (1995).6 In fact it may be argued that the potential of the global R&D stock 
for catching-up should be relatively high for developed economies that already have a high 
level of absorptive capacities and would yield comparatively marginal benefits from 
investment in education and other social capabilities (Archibughi and Mitchie, 1998).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The intermediate position of technology flow matrices is confirmed by van Pottelsberghe (1997), who applies 
the different weights to the same dataset. Moreover, these results vindicate the approach of most empirical 
studies to use one and the same matrix across different countries.  
 
5 See Cincera and van Pottelsberghe, 2001, Mohnen, 2002 and Los and Verspagen  2003  for recent in-depth 
reviews of the empirical spillover literature. 
6 Also the simulation results of Verspagen (1997b) exhibit to some degree a relatively high contribution to 
productivity growth for the smaller economies in the sample.  
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3. European performance relative to the world economic leaders 
 
The eagerness of European policy makers to bring Europe to the economic frontier of the 
world is obviously rooted in the feeling that Europe is behind relative to the USA and other 
leading countries in the world in terms of technology and productivity. The aim of this 
section is to document the European gap in this respect. We focus on the manufacturing 
industry, which we subdivide into 21 sectors, documented in Table 1. The sources of the data 
are the OECD STAN database, and various parts of the Groningen Growth and Development 
database. The newest version of the STAN database, using the ISIC rev. 3 classification, 
covers the period 1980 – 1998, while the older version of it, using the ISIC rev. 2 
classification covers the period 1970 – 1994. Merging these editions and accounting for the 
different classification schemes we obtain a dataset that covers the period of 1973-1997. We 
derive the growth rates of total factor productivity from this database, in the way that is 
described in more detail below.  
 
We use additional data on hours worked per person, unit value ratios (for value added) and 
value added deflators from the GGDC database to set up a benchmark of total factor 
productivity levels relative to the USA for 1997 (on the general nature of the data, see, e.g., 
Van Ark, 1996).7 The TFP growth rates derived from STAN are used to retrapolate this 
benchmark on a yearly basis to the early 1970s. Because the STAN database has some 
serious holes in terms of the coverage for some countries, we focus on only four European 
countries, and compare these to the USA. The four European countries are Germany, France, 
Italy and the United Kingdom.  
 
We use employment (in number of jobs) as our indicator of labour input in the total factor 
productivity growth rate calculations. In this part of the calculations, no correction for hours 
worked is made, because the data on hours in the GGDC database is not available for a large 
part of the period we are interested in. Value added is our output indicator, and a constructed 
capital stock is taken as the only other production factor. The capital stock is constructed on 
the basis of the investment time series, using a perpetual inventory method (with a 
depreciation rate equal to 0.15). We have to resort to using aggregate purchasing power 
parities for the capital stocks supplied by the Penn World Tables, because the GGDC 
database does not supply sectoral data on capital stocks (or investment flows). In summary, 
the 1997 benchmark of for total factor productivity levels is based on state-of-the art methods 
that take into account differences between sectors in terms of unit value ratios and hours 
worked, but the growth rates that are used to retrapolate this benchmark are based on more 
rough measures.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The specific way in which this is done involves retrapolating the 1997 unit value ratios in the GGDC database 
to 1990 by means of the value added deflators. 
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Table 1.  Sectors in the analysis 
ISIC rev.2 ISIC rev.3 Short description 
31 15-16 Food, beverages & tobacco 
32 17-19 Textiles, apparel & leather 
33 20 Wood products & furniture 
34 21-22 Paper, paper products & printing 
351+352 24 Industrial chemicals, drugs & medicines 
353+354 23 Petroleum & coal products 
355+356 25 Rubber & plastic products 
36 26 Non-metallic mineral products 
37 27 Iron & steel, non-ferrous metals 
381 28 Metal products 
3825 30 Office & computing machinery 
382-3825 29 Non-electrical machinery 
3832 32 Radio, TV & communication equipment 
383-3832 31 Electrical apparatus, nec 
3841 351 Shipbuilding & repairing 
3843 34 Motor vehicles 
3845 353 Aircraft 
3842+3844+3849 352, 359 Other transport 
385 33 Professional goods 
39 36-37 Other manufacturing 
 
 
 
Figure 1 describes the evolution of total factor productivity gaps (ratios) in manufacturing 
sectors between the European countries and the USA. A value larger than one indicates a 
European lead. The vertical axis of these figures gives the frequency of sectors with the 
specific value of the gap displayed on the horizontal axis. Thus, a peak in the plotted surface 
points to a cluster of sectors at the specific value of the productivity gap. The distribution 
displayed in the figure is smoothed using a so-called kernel density estimation method (see 
Härdle, 1990).8 The raw data consist of the value of the productivity gap for each of the 21 
sectors in the four countries (hence there are 84 observations for each year) for the period 
specified in the graphs. The kernel density estimates can be seen as smoothed histograms 
(one for every year) of these values. Peaks in the figure indicate that relatively many sectors 
cluster at the value of the productivity gap displayed on the horizontal axis below. The value 
1 on the horizontal axis demarcates the difference between European productivity leadership 
(>1) and a European productivity backlog (<1). 
 
In Figure 1, it is obvious that on average, the European countries indeed face a productivity 
gap relative to the USA, although it is a relatively small one.9 The peak (modal value) of the 
density plot in 1997 lies at a value of 90% (0.9), i.e., the where European countries trail 10% 
                                                 
8 We use Stata’s kdensity function, with the default Epanechnikov kernel. 
9 Our four European countries display above-EU average productivity, so that the results in this section must be 
seen as a lower boundary to the gap of the total EU. 
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behind US productivity. 53% of the total density (sectors) has a 10% or higher backlog, i.e. is 
found to the left of the peak for 1997. 36% of the density is found in the right tail that 
represents European sectors leading over the USA in terms of total factor productivity (values 
larger than 1).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of the distribution of total factor productivity gaps of four 
European countries vs. the United States, the horizontal axis indicates the ratio of European 
productivity over US productivity 
 
 
Over time, the evolution is one in which the distribution becomes more narrow and peaked, 
but the overall centre of the distribution does not shift very much. In the early 1970s, the peak 
lies at 85%, i.e., a somewhat larger European backlog, but at the same time, a larger fraction 
(48%) of the total density is found at values larger than one (i.e., a European lead). The early 
periods also show a relatively long trail of sectors on the right hand side, which corresponds 
to a limited number of European sectors that operate at the ‘leading edge’ of productivity. 
This ‘leading edge’ largely disappears over the 30-year period in the graph, until we have the 
relatively narrow and peaked distribution of the late 1990s. 
 
 
 
 8
4. R&D in Europe and the global economy: Reality and the Barcelona R&D target 
 
The large majority of R&D in the world is carried out by firms, universities and public or 
semi-public research organizations. Figure 2 shows the total R&D intensity in Europe, on the 
one hand, and USA on the other hand. R&D intensity is defined as total R&D as a % of GDP. 
Over the period 1980-2000, this value fluctuates between 2 ½ and 3% in the USA, while it is 
almost a full %-point lower in the European Union10 (all averages across countries are 
calculated as weighted averages). For the four European countries identified in the previous 
section, the value is slightly higher than the EU-average: it fluctuates around 2%.  
 
Figure 2 thus supports the impression of European backlog in R&D that led to the Barcelona 
target of a 3 % R&D intensity. In order to achieve this target, and given the value of GDP in 
the year 2000, Europe’s R&D effort in that year would need to be expanded by (roughly) one 
third. Obviously, this is a large increase, and one may put question marks to the possibility to 
achieve this, especially so in times of a downturn in the world business cycle, as well as more 
than a year having passed since the Barcelona meeting, without clear policy measures aimed 
at stimulating R&D extra having been undertaken in many European countries.  
 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
USA
EU-TOT
EU-5
 
Figure 2. R&D intensity (Total R&D as a % of GDP) 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The European Union is defined as EU-16 over the complete period. 
 9
While we believe that the Barcelona R&D targets will be rather hard to achieve, we 
undertake the analysis in the remainder of this paper under the assumption that it will indeed 
be possible to achieve these targets. The aim of this analysis is to assess the impact that 
increased R&D intensity may have on the productivity gaps facing the European economy.  
 
 
5. Assessing the impact of ‘Barcelona’ on European productivity gaps 
 
The empirical and theoretical literature on R&D and productivity provides a practical 
framework to assess the impact of increased R&D efforts in Europe on technology gaps 
between Europe and the USA. In this assessment, account will have to be taken of the fact 
that R&D does not only have an impact in the firm/sector where it is undertaken, but also, 
partly spills over to other sectors in the domestic and foreign economy. Viewed in this way, 
much of the increased R&D efforts as a result of ‘Barcelona’ will be absorbed within the EU 
itself due to the nature of the integration of European economies. However, it will also add to 
the technology content of exports to the main non-European competitors with the potential to 
generate productivity increases there. The aim of this section is to employ a simulation 
exercise to assess the net effect of the mechanisms on the productivity gaps identified in 
Section 3 above. 
 
The methodology that will be used in this section is based on a theoretical framework in 
which scale economies play no role. An important debate in the ‘new growth’ literature is 
about the role of technology in scale effects. The early endogenous growth models in, e.g., 
Romer (1986, 1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991) lead to the conclusion that an increase 
in the knowledge stock of a country (in whichever way we may measure this) will lead to an 
increase in the growth rate. This represents a mechanism of strong scale economies, in 
which, ceteris paribus, large countries are at an advantage. Jones (1995) argues that the 
empirical data do not support such strong effects of scale economies related to knowledge 
and R&D stocks. Instead, Jones (1995) proposes a model in which the growth rate of an 
economy depends on the growth rate of population, i.e., the growth of (human) resources that 
can be put into the development of new knowledge (so-called semi-endogenous growth).  
 
Although the so-called Jones-critique of strong scale effects has led to a debate in which the 
possibility of some form of scale economies related to knowledge and R&D has not been 
ruled out, we proceed here to implement a model that is rooted in an earlier empirical 
approach (e.g., Griliches, 1979) in which the level of total factor productivity depends on the 
level of the knowledge stock, and the rate of growth of total factor productivity thus depends 
on the growth of a knowledge (or R&D capital) stock. The reason for adopting this relatively 
conservative approach is that this model can still be considered as the main theoretical 
workhorse for the empirical work in this area. Moreover, since an important part of our 
calculations will take the form of extrapolating on the basis of increased R&D stocks in 
Europe, a model incorporating scale effects that have not been empirically verified over a 
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large range of the relevant variables may be too optimistic in assessing the increased 
productivity effects. 
 
For the calculation of productivity effects we use the concept of ‘direct and indirect’ R&D 
from the spillovers literature. We take the same sectors as above, and focus on business R&D 
only. The method we employ will be to add one-third to the R&D stocks of European 
sectors.The 3% Barcelona R&D intensity target actually implies a somewhat larger 
multiplication fractor, but in light of the above discussion, we feel that this is a too ambitious 
target.11 This implies that current R&D levels in Europe increase by (roughly) 33% (taking 
GDP as given, something we will do for all analysis in this section). We assume that the 
distribution of R&D over private and non-private sources does not change, i.e., that the one-
third increase applies to both types of R&D. 
 
We take 1997 as the reference year (this is the most recent year for which disaggregated 
R&D stocks can be calculated for the countries in our sample). Because our R&D stocks are 
simply summations over time (taking into account also knowledge depreciation), a once-and-
for-all multiplication of R&D investment by 1.33 also implies a multiplication of the R&D 
stocks by 1.33. We therefore perform a simulation in which all European R&D stocks are 
multiplied by 1.33 and compare the total factor productivity levels implied by this to the 
levels implied by the actual 1997 R&D stocks.  
 
From the ‘direct’ R&D stocks, we calculate domestically and internationally acquired 
‘indirect’ R&D stocks (see appendix for mathematical details). For the construction of these 
we rely on a weighting scheme developed by Verspagen (1997a). This scheme uses patent 
statistics, and is based on co-classification of patents in terms of their technological class. 
When a patent is classified in more than a single technology class, and these classes ‘belong 
to’ different industries, this is taken as a spillover from one sector (where the main 
technology class of the patent is) to another sector (where the supplementary technology class 
of the patent is). In this way, a matrix can be set up that gives the share of all patents 
generated in a sector that spillover to all other sectors. In Verspagen (1997b) these weights 
were used to construct domestic and foreign indirect R&D stocks, and the results were 
applied to an estimation of the impact of R&D and R&D spillovers on total factor 
productivity. We use the elasticities obtained in Verspagen (1997b), and documented in Table 
3, in the simulation exercises in this section. In addition to these ‘technology weights’, 
domestic indirect R&D is weighted by the share of domestic producers on the market; 
‘imported’ R&D is weighed by the share of foreign producers (broken down at the country 
level). TFP growth is simply given as the sum of the three components (own sector R&D, 
domestic indirect R&D from other sectors, foreign indirect R&D), weighted by their output 
elasticities.  
 
                                                 
11 The calculated effects are linear in the growth rates. 
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Table 2. Empirical coefficients (output elasticities) used in the simulations 
 OwnR&D
Domestic 
indirect 
R&D 
Foreign 
indirect 
R&D 
    
High-tech (Radio, TV & communication equipment; 
Office & computing machinery; Professional goods; 
Aircraft) 
0.177 0.025 0.061 
Medium-tech (Industrial chemicals, drugs & medicines; 
Non-electrical machinery; Electrical apparatus) 0.078 0.022 0.032 
Low-tech (Food, beverages & tobacco; Textiles, apparel & 
leather; Wood products & furniture; Paper, paper products 
& printing; Petroleum & coal products; Rubber & plastic 
products; Non-metallic mineral products; Iron & steel, non-
ferrous metals; Metal products; Shipbuilding & repairing; 
Motor vehicles; Other transport; Other manufacturing) 
0.084 0.040 0.045 
 
 
Table 3 documents the productivity effects in the four European countries and the USA for 
the various simulation experiments. Our first experiment, described above, is to multiply all 
European R&D stocks by 1.33, the value associated with the Barcelona target. This 
corresponds to an ‘untargeted’ or uniform R&D impulse, i.e., one in which all sectors 
increase R&D expenditures by the same proportional rate. The effect of this is to raise total 
factor productivity levels in Europe across the 21 sectors of our analysis by an average of 
4.4%, with a relatively narrow variation (standard deviation equal to 1.0%-points) over the 
sectors. The USA also benefits from this European R&D policy, and realizes a projected 
0.6% increase in total factor productivity levels (with a standard deviation equal to half this 
value). Thus, both European and USA levels of productivity may be expected to rise across 
the board of manufacturing sectors as a result of the Barcelona targets, if and when 
successfully achieved. 
 
Table 3. Average growth rates over sectors of total factor productivity in simulation 
experiments (standard deviations between brackets) 
 Growth of productivity relative to base case (1997 real data) 
Description of simulation 
experiment 
EU-4 USA 
 
 
Ratio increase 
EU to USA 
 
Uniform R&D impulse in EU 4.4 % (1.0%) 0.6% (0.3%) 7.3 
Targeted high-tech R&D 
impulse in EU 
8.0% (12.5%) 1.5% (1.9%) 5.3 
Targeted medium-tech R&D 
impulse in EU 
8.9% (4.1%) 2.5% (1.1%) 3.6 
Targeted low-tech R&D 
impulse in EU 
13.3% (11.6%) 0.4% (0.6%) 33.3 
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The result is, obviously, a reduction in European technology gaps. This is documented in 
Figure 3, which gives the kernel density estimations for the first simulation experiment and 
the real data for 1997. The latter is taken from Figure 1 (last year), but is now reproduced in a 
2-dimensional format. The evenness of the impact of increased R&D across sectors is evident 
from the almost parallel shift of the density curve. The peak (modal value) of the distribution 
shifts to the right, and is now found at a value of 0.95, i.e., where European productivity lags 
behind US productivity 5%-points. 41% of the total density is now found in the domain 
where European productivity leads over US productivity (to the right of 1 on the horizontal 
axis). Although this is a clear improvement of the European situation, it does not represent a 
very clear take-over of the US by Europe. In other words, although the increased R&D levels 
as a result of the Barcelona targets are beneficial for European industry, they do not seem to 
lead to the targeted European productivity leadership.  
 
0
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0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Estimated for real data, 1997 Uniform impulse
 
Figure 3. Kernel density estimates for real productivity gaps (1997) and simulated gaps 
(a European R&D impulse uniformly distributed over sectors) 
 
 
In order to compare the impact of the different sectoral R&D stocks on the distribution of 
European productivity gaps, we also document the results of some other thought-
experiments, in which only a number of sectoral R&D stocks are varied at the same time. In 
these experiments, we employ the commonly used distinction between high-tech, medium-
tech and low-tech sectors. This classification is based on average R&D intensity across the 
OECD countries, and is documented in Table 2 in the specific way in which it was used here. 
Note that because our level of disaggregation of sectors does not completely correspond to 
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the usual scheme, we had to change some of the usual definitions. The most notable of these 
changes is that we merge pharmaceuticals (normally considered as a high-tech sector) with 
chemicals (normally considered as a medium-tech sector), and treat the resulting sector as a 
medium-tech sector. 
 
In the sectoral experiments, we employ a broad reasoning that corresponds to “putting all 
money on one card”. This means that we still start from a one-third increase in total R&D 
efforts (stocks), but now put these additional expenditures into a single of the three broad 
sectoral classifications (low-, medium or high-tech). In order to find the multiplication factor 
of R&D stocks that corresponds to this, we use the following formula: 
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where R represents R&D stocks, the subscripts H, M and L indicate high-tech, medium-tech 
and low-tech, respectively, the subscripts t and t+1 indicate before and after experiment 
periods, and σ indicates a share in total R&D. A ‘focused’ R&D impulse is calculated using 
this formula, by setting the ratio Ri,t+1/Ri,t to 1 (i.e., no change) for the two sectoral classes on 
which the R&D impulse is not focused, and then solving for the same ratio for the sectoral 
class on which the R&D is focused. For example, in case of an R&D impulse focused on 
low-tech, this yields 
.133.0
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R
σ  
This shows that we can calculate the ratio at which R&D stocks in the focused sectoral class 
must be increased as a function of the targeted overall increase (one third, or 0.33) and the 
share of the sectoral class in total R&D stocks. For sectoral classes that represent a small 
(large) share in total stocks, a large (small) proportionate increase is necessary to 
accommodate the increase of total R&D by one third. 
 
Figure 4 and Error! Reference source not found. document the sectoral distribution of total 
R&D stocks for the broad aggregates used in the experiments. Obviously, the low-tech R&D 
stocks make up the smallest part of total R&D stocks in both the EU-4 and the USA, 
accounting for approximately 10% at the end of the period. In the USA, the medium-tech 
sectors are somewhat smaller than in Europe, and the reverse holds (by implication) for the 
high-tech sectors. We use the EU-4 shares in 1997 to calculate the implied multiplication 
factors for the high-, medium and low-tech sectors according to the above formula. This 
yields a factor of 5.0, 3.5 and 11.4, respectively. It must be noted that these factors are quite 
high, especially so for low-tech sectors, and hence it is not very realistic to assume that such a 
focused R&D strategy could ever be actually implemented. The calculations using these 
multiplication factors are, however, intended to illustrate the differences in sectoral impact, 
rather than to make actual predictions of what could happen. 
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Table 3 shows that the largest productivity effects of increased R&D are to be expected from 
the medium-tech sectors. For the focused low-tech R&D impulse, an average 13.3% total 
factor productivity increase in Europe is found, while this value is almost 0.4% in the USA 
(as a result of increased European R&D). Moreover, the effects of increasing high-tech R&D 
are highly variable over sectors, as indicated by the fact that standard deviation is larger than 
the mean (this is less so the case for medium- and low-tech sectors). The ratio of the increase 
of productivity in Europe and the USA is highest for the focused low-tech impulse, indicating 
that in this sectoral class, increased European R&D efforts are ‘appropriated’ to the largest 
extent.  
 
Figure 5 shows the effects in terms of 
the distribution of total factor 
productivity gaps over sectors for the 
focused high-tech impulse. The latter 
is compared against two different 
baseline cases, i.e., the kernel density 
estimate of the productivity gaps 
resulting in the first experiment 
(uniform R&D impulse), and the 
empirical observation for 1997. 
While the uniform R&D impulse 
shifts the kernel estimate almost in a 
parallel fashion, this is much less the 
case for the focused high-tech R&D 
impulse. For the focused high-tech 
R&D impulse, the peak of the 
distribution actually shifts slightly to 
the left, to a value of 0.85 (15% 
European productivity backlog). 42% 
of the total density lies to the right of 
the value 1 in case of the focused 
high-tech R&D impulse, indicating 
that, overall, there is a rightward shift 
of the distribution (the value is 36% 
for the empirically observed 
distribution).  But what is most 
striking in the case of the focused 
high-tech impulse is that a small 
number of sectors on the right hand 
side of the distribution benefits most. 
This ‘leading edge’ of European sectors gains relatively much as a result of a targeted high-
tech impulse.  
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Figure 4. Percentual distribution of R&D 
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The focused medium-tech impulse is displayed in Figure 7. Here we note a shift of the kernel 
density that is almost equal to the case of a uniform R&D impulse, and almost exactly 
parallel to the empirically observed density. The peak of the distribution stays, however, at a 
value of 0.9 (10% productivity back log for Europe), which is also the empirically observed 
peak. In this case, 44% of the total density lies to the right of 1 (European productivity lead).   
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Figure 5. Kernel density estimates for simulated productivity gaps (a European R&D 
impulse focused on high-tech sectors) 
 
 
Finally, Figure 8 displays the result of a focused low-tech R&D impulse. In comparison to 
the two earlier focused R&D impulses (high-tech and medium-tech), the effects are more 
dramatic for low-tech. We observe a relatively strong shift of the part of the distribution that 
is immediately to the right of the peak, while the peak itself (by implication, because the total 
density is constant) shifts downwardly relatively much. Also the ‘leading edge’ European 
sectors (to the far right) shift relatively much as a result of the focused low-tech R&D 
impulse. The fraction of the density that lies to the right of the value 1 is 51% in case of the 
focused low-tech impulse, and the peak of the distribution occurs at 0.95 (5% European 
productivity backlog). 
 
Summarizing, it seems indeed to be the case that R&D policies aimed at different sectors may 
have different effects in terms of the distribution of productivity effects over sectors. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the most dramatic effects are associated to R&D in low-tech, while medium-
tech sectors have the most evenly distributed impact. 
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Figure 6. Kernel density estimates for simulated productivity gaps (a European R&D 
impulse focused on medium-tech sectors) 
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Figure 7. Kernel density estimates for simulated productivity gaps (a European R&D 
impulse focused on low-tech sectors) 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this paper we have documented European total factor productivity gaps relative to the 
USA. Although our method of calculating productivity levels in these countries is imperfect, 
it was shown that Europe indeed lags behind somewhat to the USA in terms of total factor 
productivity in many manufacturing industries. We discussed the European ambition, 
expressed at the Lisbon Summit, to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic economy in 
the world’. For reason of the relationship between R&D and productivity, we were especially 
interested in the targets set in Barcelona for European R&D intensity. In an analysis of 
current R&D trends, it was concluded that these targets are indeed ambitious, implying an 
increase of European R&D intensity by one third. 
 
We then proceeded to apply a simple simulation method, based on the empirical literature on 
R&D and productivity, to estimate the impact of the Barcelona targets, assuming they can 
successfully be implemented, on the productivity gaps in manufacturing industry between 
Europe and the USA. Our model makes many simplifying assumptions, but its main virtue is 
that it does take into account the indirect impact of R&D, in terms of spillovers, in other 
sectors and countries than where the R&D effort is originally made. Thus, it was shown that 
also the USA may expect to benefit from increased European R&D, although at relatively 
low rates. The net effect on European productivity gaps is expected to be positive from the 
European perspective, i.e., will lead to a catch-up of total factor productivity levels relative to 
the USA.  
 
However, the results also indicate that the expected effects are relatively small compared to 
the size of existing productivity gaps facing European industries. According to our estimates, 
which are to be looked as a rough indication of orders of magnitude, achievement of the 
Barcelona targets in a purely quantitative sense (i.e., ceteris paribus raising R&D intensity to 
3% of GDP) will not put the European economy clearly in the lead in terms of productivity 
relatively to the USA. According to our simulations, a focused R&D impulse in low-tech 
industries can be expected to have the strongest effect, but it is unrealistic to assume that 
these sectors alone can achieve the Barcelona R&D target.  
 
These results imply that, according to the estimations of our model, a policy solely aimed 
increasing R&D expenditures, without paying any attention to the broad institutional context 
in which innovation and technological development take place, is not likely to succeed. 
Raising R&D expenditures may be one part of the story behind the European backlog, but 
factors such as absorptive capacity, interaction between researchers in public and private 
organizations, finding the right level of intellectual property rights protection, etc., may be 
just as important in achieving the Lisbon ambition. Our model does not have to say much on 
these factors (which can be argued to represent changes in the R&D elasticities that our 
models takes as given), but it does point out that more research on these issues may be useful, 
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and that the story of regaining European technological and economic leadership may be a 
more complicated one that the Lisbon and Barcelona summits want us to believe. 
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Appendix – Data, Methods and Variables 
 
The analysis draws on the OECD STAN, ANBERD and BITRA databases, merging their 
ISIC-Rev.2 and ISIC-Rev.3 versions for a longitudinal dataset, covering 21 industries in 7 
countries for the period of 1973-1997 (table 1). These sectoral data are used to calculate both 
domestic and ‘international’, i.e. imported R&D stocks. To derive constant price series in US 
dollars, implicit deflators from STAN and PPPs from the Penn World Tables were employed. 
The countries covered include the EU member states of France, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, as well as the United States. Japan is included as a country from/to which 
spillovers flow, but this country is not included in the productivity comparisons. 
 
Following Verspagen (1997b) we start from an augmented Cobb-Douglas production 
function 
 ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijtY A K L RD IRD IRF
α β ρ δ φ=  (1.1) 
where Y represents production, A the usual scale variable,  and K and L capital and labour 
inputs respectively. RD is ‘own’, i.e. direct R&D, IRD is domestic indirect R&D, IRF is 
‘foreign’, i.e. indirectly imported R&D. α, β, ρ, δ, φ are the relevant output elasticities. The 
indices i, j and t refer to country, sector and time. 
 
Neglecting indices, total factor productivity can be measured as a function of total R&D: 
 ( )/TFP Y K Lα β≡  (1.2) 
or, combining (1.1) and (1.2), in the form of growth rates: 
  
 TFP RD IRD IRF
TFP RD IRD IRF
ρ δ φ
• • • •
= + +  (1.3) 
 
Capital stocks are constructed by applying the perpetual inventory method, that is 
 1(1 )t t tK K Iψ −= − +  (1.4) 
with I being investment in fixed capital, the depreciation rate ψ set to 0.15 and an initial 
capital stock of 5 times It+1 (assuming an initial growth rate of 5 per cent). The ‘own’ R&D 
stocks are constructed similarly using R&D expenditures. 
 
For indirect domestic R&D, the sectoral R&D stocks are weighted by coefficients from a 
patent citation matrix based on EPO statistics (Verspagen, 1997a). For domestically acquired 
R&D we set their diagonal elements to zero to avoid double-counting. Finally, we weight 
with the share of domestic inputs; that is 
 ( )1 ,                      ik jk ij ij
j
IRD m RD j kω= − ≠∑  (1.5) 
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where ωjk designates the share of sector j in sector k’s citations and mj stands for the import 
penetration of the domestic market. For imported R&D we keep the diagonal elements and 
aggregate as   
 ik jk ij hj ihj
h j
IRF m RD sω= ∑∑  (1.6) 
using import penetration-weighted input coefficients, and RDhj, the R&D stock of the export 
country h, being weighted by its import share in country i, sihj. We take this variable as a 
proxy for the degree of interaction between two countries (Verspagen, 1997b).  
 
The simulation uses hypothetical R&D stocks as explained in the main text and calculates 
corresponding indirect R&D as in (1.5) and (1.6). To calculate hypothetical TFP growth the 
elasticity estimates (as in table 3) by Verspagen (1997b), who uses a comparable set of 
OECD countries and sectors, were employed and fed into (1.3). 
  
 
 
